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Stephan Leuenberger
August 18, 2005
The woman stared at the fruit. ...
She wanted the wisdom that it would give her,
and she ate some of the fruit. ...
So the Lord sent them out of the Garden of Eden.
Genesis 3
1 Actualism and the Possibilist Paradise
Analytic philosophers appear to quantify over unactualized possibilities all
the time, as if they believed in a plurality of full-blooded worlds, spatio-
temporal arrangements of individuals, properties and relations. For exam-
ple, metaphysicians discuss whether individuals have some properties in all
worlds in which they exist, or whether any pair of properties can co-exist in
one world. A domain of discourse that includes possibilia allows to sharpen
up questions, claims and arguments. Its benefits are so great that David
Lewis called it “Philosopher’s Paradise”.1 However, many philosophers are
actualists, denying that there are any unactualized entities. Can they never-
theless partake of paradise, i.e. make sense of questions phrased in terms of
∗Many thanks to Karen Bennett, John P. Burgess, Adam Elga, Alexander Paseau,
Daniel Rothschild, Brett Sherman, Ted Sider, and an anonymous referee.
1This is the title of part I of On the Plurality of Worlds, Oxford: Blackwell, 1986.
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possible worlds and individuals? Prima facie it is not clear what actualists
are committing themselves to when they affirm an existential quantification
over possibilia. They are thus under the obligation to give a story about
what they are doing. If they cannot discharge it, modal realists like Lewis
will mercilessly expel them from paradise.
Linguistic Ersatzism, as characterized by Lewis, seems to offer such a
story: the worlds quantified over are not concrete universes, but maximally
consistent classes of sentences.2 Linguistic Ersatzism gives truth-values of
possibilist idioms as a function of the consistency of classes of sentences in
a non-possibilist language. For example, ‘There is a possible world in which
there is a talking donkey.’ comes out true because ‘There is a talking donkey.’
is a member of a maximally consistent class of sentences.
Does Linguistic Ersatzism offer a reduction of the possibilist language to
a meta-language, with a consistency predicate, of a non-possibilist language?
Lewis has shown that it does not. What is supposed to be the reducing
language is too poor in descriptive power to determine the truth-values of all
sentences of the possibilist languages. Lewis’s well-known example involves
aliens, properties not existing in the actual world. He raises the question
whether there could be a pair of role-swappers : alien properties such that
two worlds only differ from each other with respect to which of these two
properties plays which role. Linguistic Ersatzism, depending on how exactly
it is understood, either cannot make sense of this question, or answers it
trivially in the negative.3 This is its so-called “problem of descriptive power”.
2Lewis’s influential discussion is in “Paradise on the Cheap?”, which is Part III of
On the Plurality of Worlds, loc.cit. What he calls “Linguistic Ersatzism” is a technical
elaboration of proposals by R.M. Adams, Carnap and Jeffrey.
3Unamended, it cannot make sense of the question. It gives a negative answer if “there
is a property X such that there is a world in which Φ(X)” is taken as a substitutional
quantification and translated as “there is a property name N such that ‘Φ(N/X)’ belongs
to some maximally consistent class of sentences”, where ‘Φ(N)’ names the result of substi-
tuting N for X in Φ(X), and where the quantification ranges only over actual names. In
that version, Linguistic Ersatzism implies that there are no alien properties, and a fortiori
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Thus if an actualist aspires to use the full range of the possibilist language,
she needs to develop a different theory.
In “The Ersatz Pluriverse”, Theodore Sider attempts to do that:
Like many, I turn to reduction. An adequate reduction of talk
of possibilia—worlds and their inhabitants—must be materially
adequate, but must not appeal to objectionable entities (like
Lewisian worlds). Given such a reduction, the contemporary
possible-worlds theorist’s tools may be freely used with a clear
ontological conscience.4
For Linguistic Ersatzism, the basis of the (partial) reduction is a metalin-
guistic consistency predicate. It can thus respect the traditional empiricist
constraint that all necessity is linguistic, or conceptual. In Quine’s terms,
Linguistic Ersatzism is modally involved to the first grade. Sider’s theory, in
contrast, is modally involved to the third grade. It assumes that not only iter-
ating modal operators, but also quantifying into modal contexts makes sense,
and produces sentences which have truth-values.5 The question whether this
cost in ideology outweighs the gain in descriptive power is likely to get dif-
ferent answers from different philosophers, depending on how comfortable
they are with irreducible de re modality and essentialism. I am not trying
to adjudicate it here.
Sider is explicit that his theory is reductive specifically about the pos-
sibilist language, and does not attempt a reduction of the modal notion of
possibility as well. If the reduction is successful, any dispute in the possibilist
language is meaningful in the reducing language. Sider claims that the theory
he presents, which I call “Pluriversal Ersatzism”, achieves such a reduction.
no alien role-swappers.
4This JOURNAL, XCIX (2002), pp. 279-315. Quotation from p. 281.
5Since Sider advocates counterpart-theory, he does not assume that for individual vari-
ables, but it is crucial for his solution to the problem of alien role-swappers that quantifi-
cation over property variables into modal contexts is allowed.
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He lists four examples of possibilist sentences that actualists might want to
use, and argues:
The reduction does indeed assign truth conditions to these sen-
tences... Thus my reduction allows one to partake fully of modal
metaphysics and semantics. (p. 306)
However, the last statement is a non sequitur ; the reduction might succeed
with these four examples but fail with others. Thus it has not been shown
that Sider’s theory gives actualists a licence to use the full possibilist lan-
guage. I will show that in fact, it does not give such a licence, by presenting
an example of a possibilist distinction Sider’s theory cannot cope with. The
theory thus fails to do the job it is designed for.
2 Pluriversal Ersatzism: Exposition
Pluriversal Ersatzism uses a modal language, which I call ML, as its reduc-
ing language. A reduction does not need to provide a recursive translation
between two languages. It can make a detour through model-theoretic se-
mantics, if the same models are used to define truth of sentences of the two
languages. In the case at hand, so-called “modal models” are the relevant
ones, set-theoretic structures modelling the space of possible worlds.6 Pos-
sibilist sentences can straightforwardly be interpreted as true or false in one
of these models. Sentences of ML are evaluated in the way familiar from
the possible-worlds-semantics for modal logic. If every ML-sentence that is
true (simpliciter) is true in a modal model M, then M is realistic. Sider
stipulates:
(1) A possibilist sentence is true iff it is true in every realistic model; it
is false iff its negation is true.
6See pp. 292-293.
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A simple example may illustrate how the reduction is supposed to work.
Suppose that ‘It is possible that there is a talking donkey.’ is a true ML-
sentence. This sentence is true in all and only the modal models in which
for some w, the extension of ‘talking’ in w and the extension of ‘donkey’
in w overlap. Since the sentence is true, every realistic model fulfills that
condition. Hence the possibilist sentence ‘There is a world in which there is
a talking donkey.’ is true in every realistic model. By (1), it is true. If we
suppose, on the other hand, that ‘It is possible that there is a talking donkey.’
is false, we can conclude by similar reasoning that ‘There is a world in which
there is a talking donkey.’ is false. In either case, the theory succeeds in
giving a truth-value to that particular possibilist sentence.
Does it likewise succeed for all other possibilist sentences? This crucial
question about the expressive power of ML is not addressed in full generality
in Sider’s article. As I noted above, he claims in one place that the reduction
works, based on the successful handling of a few examples. However, in
another place he acknowledges that he has not proved this: “It is unclear to
me at present whether a harmful multiplicity arises from CONSTRAINTS
failing to constrain realistic models up to isomorphism.”7 Before showing
that such a multiplicity may arise, I want to clarify what exactly a reduction
would have to achieve.
It is crucial that for any sentence in the possibilist language, it can be
shown that it has a truth-value, independently of what the ML-truths are.
In the above example, this condition is fulfilled; we do not have to assume
either the truth or the falsity of ‘It is possible that there are talking donkeys’.
It is a language that is to be reduced, not a particular theory formulated in
that language. Sider rightly points out in several places that the reduction
should not be hostage to substantive claims.8 It is supposed to be neutral
7Footnote 27, p. 295. ‘CONSTRAINTS’ denotes the class of true ML-sentences that
are de dicto with respect to quantifiers binding individual variables.
8For example, on p. 286 and pp. 314-315.
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among competing metaphysical views, since it only provides a framework in
which they can be debated. For all we know, Linguistic Ersatzism might give
the right verdict on alien role-swappers, since for all we know there might be
no alien properties at all.9 But for all we know, it gets it wrong, and that is
enough to disqualify it as a reduction.
In logician’s terminology, two models are elementarily equivalent relative
to a language L if exactly the same sentences of L are true in both mod-
els. Given that isomorphism between two models is defined in such a way
that no possibilist sentence has different truth-values in isomorphic models,
reducibility would be established if it could be shown that only isomorphic
modal models are elementarily equivalent relative to ML. On the other hand,
reduciblity can be shown to fail by describing, in the possibilist language, a
pair of non-isomorphic modal models that are elementarily equivalent. This
is, in effect, what Lewis did for Linguistic Ersatzism, and what I will do for
Pluriversal Ersatzism.10
Whether the possibilist language is reducible in the sense explained de-
pends on the expressive power of ML. Sider makes this language, which has
a possibility- and an actuality-operator as modal primitives, very powerful.
It has a name for every actual individual and property. Since every actual
entity is its own name, it is a so-called Lagadonian language.11 Moreover,
ML allows infinite disjunctions and conjunctions. The quantifiers are world-
restricted, or actualist: when the modal-model-semantics evaluates a formula
at w, it interprets the quantifiers as ranging only over the domain of w (see
pp. 292 and 293).
9Linguistic Ersatzism can be taken to say that there are no alien properties. See
footnote 3.
10While the next section gives an informal argument, the appendix presents a proof.
11A qualification is needed here: if every actual entity were its own name, then some
symbol would have to be ambiguous, for we need logical expressions besides names in the
language. The problem can be solved by a code for assigning sets as non-Lagadonian names
for other sets, thereby making some small sets available to serve as logical expressions.
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ML is supposed to be the reducing language. I have so far only vaguely
characterized the language to be reduced as the “possibilist language” that
philosophers are using. It is ostensibly talking about individuals instantiating
properties at worlds.12 Fortunately, we do not need to specify a precise
syntax for it. To ask whether it is reducible, it suffices in any case to know
its expressive power in terms of modal models. The question then becomes
whether the modal language can express the same distinctions among these
models.
When arguing that there are non-isomorphic modal models that are ele-
mentarily equivalent, I will use our possibilist language, which is a fragment
of what is sometimes called ‘philosopher’s English’, i.e. ordinary English
plus logic and set theory. Thereby I will show that the two models are dis-
tinguishable in the possibilist language, and hence that the reduction fails.
We can thus ignore in the following the second Lagadonian language that
Sider’s paper introduces. It is an infinitary possibilist language, which is also
given a semantics in terms of modal models. For the purpose of reduction, its
details are irrelevant. The reducing languageMLmay certainly be a language
we cannot speak. But that some language can be reduced is relevant only
for those who want to speak that language. Hence a reduction of Sider’s
Lagadonian possibilist language would be relevant only for the philosophers
of Lagado, of whom Captain Lemuel Gulliver reports the following:
[M]any of the most learned and wise adhere to the new scheme
of expressing themselves by things, which hath only this inconve-
nience attending it, that if a man’s business be very great, and of
various kinds, he must be obliged in proportion to carry a greater
bundle of things upon his back, unless he can afford one or two
strong servants to attend him. I have often beheld two of these
12Only ostensibly for an actualist, of course. A realist about possible worlds, like David
Lewis, interprets it literally.
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sages almost sinking under the weight of their pack.13
But along with “the women in conjunction with the vulgar and illiterate”14
of Lagado, non-Lagadonian philosophers will refuse to adopt the new scheme,
and the question whether Sider’s Lagadonian possibilist language is reducible
is of no direct interest to them.15 While the language to be reduced should be
one that we speak, but may not be able to understand independently of any
translation, the reducing should be one that we understand independently,
although it may not be one that we speak. This last point will be important
later, in the assessment of proposals to get around the problem of ML’s lack
of expressive power.
3 Paradise Regained?
Sider’s theory fails to reduce the possibilist language to a non-possibilist
modal language. A reduction needs to answer all questions that can be asked
in the possibilist language, not just those which Lewis used as examples in
his critique of Linguistic Ersatzism. The case of role-swapping has a feature
that makes it easily amenable to be settled by ML: the pair of worlds whose
existence is in question is stipulated to have the same domain of properties.
13Jonathan Swift, Gulliver’s Travels, New York: Barnes and Noble Classics, 2003, p.
199. Originally published 1726.
14Loc.cit., pp. 198-9.
15It can be relevant only indirectly, via some relation between its expressive power
to the expressive power of a language we do use. By Sider’s Theorem on page 296,
the Lagadonian possibilist language is reducible if no two non-isomorphic modal models
are elementarily equivalent relative to ML. This leaves the question how our possibilist
language compares in expressive power to the Lagadonian possibilist language. Surely,
there are things expressible in that language that are inexpressible in our finitary language,
where many actual things do not have names. On the other hand, it seems safe to assume
that everything expressible in our language can be expressed in the Lagadonian possibilist
language. However, my argument will not depend on settling this question.
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Since inML, the quantifiers in each worlds range only over entities existing at
that world, we might suspect that trouble arises when we ask whether there
are worlds with structurally identical descriptions but different domains of
properties.
Like the old problem of descriptive power, the new problem arises from
distinct entities playing the same role. I say that properties X and Y are
alternatives of each other iff for every world w there is a world v that has
exactly the same pattern of property instantiation, except that w has Y in
all places where v has X.16 If we wish, we may think of properties having
an essence which determines what roles they possibly play. On that picture,
properties are alternatives if they have the same essence. Among alternatives,
there are both role-swappers and substitutes. Role-swappers co-exist in a
world and stand in a certain relation to each other in that world. Since they
are alternatives, there is a different world where the converse relation holds
between them. But if alternatives are not compossible, not coexisting in any
world, they are substitutes.17 Two team-mates who can both play either
central midfield or right midfield are role-swappers, and two others who can
only play as goal-keepers are substitutes of each other, unable to play together
in the team.18 Sider’s theory can deal with role-swappers, even if they come
in infinite numbers, thanks to its use of an infinitary language. It can deal
with finitely many substitutes as well. But as I now show, it cannot reduce
sentences about an infinite cardinality of substitutes, which are very easily
formulated in a possibilist language, for example by the sentence ‘There are
uncountably many substitutes’.19
16If X does not exist in w, then w and v are identical.
17Alternatives can be role-swappers with respect to some roles and substitutes with
respect to other roles, but this does not matter to my argument.
18We can think of two worlds with substitutes as differing from each other merely quid-
distically, by a “brute” non-identity of properties. Alternatively, we might think of them
as qualitatively different from each other, but in ways that are ineffable from the vantage
point of this world.
19Like Lewis, Sider takes individuals to be world-bound, and he builds this assumption
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How can it be expressed in ML that there are at least two alien substi-
tutes? Let the open sentence Φ(X) be a repertoire for a property, specifying
all the complete roles a property can play, and saying that they are all the
roles it can play. If C is a class of complete world-descriptions W in one free
variable, Φ(X) is of the following form (
∧
and
∨
take classes of formulas as
arguments and form the conjunction or disjunction, respectively, of all their
members):
(2)
∧{3W (X) : W ∈ C} ∧2[∃Y (Y = X)→ ∨{W (X) : W ∈ C}]
For any property, it is non-contingent whether it satisfies Φ(X).20 Suppose
the repertoire is such that two properties having it cannot co-exist. Thus the
following is a true sentence of ML, implying that whatever Φ-alternatives
there are will be substitues, not role-swappers:
(3) 2∀X∀Y (Φ(X) ∧ Φ(Y )→ Y = X)
This assumption about Φ is dispensable for my argument, but it makes its
formulation easier. For example, Φ might say that whenever X is instanti-
ated, it is the only property of a loner, an individual not co-existing with
anything contingent except its own parts. (4) expresses that some possible
property with repertoire Φ has at least one alternative:
(4) 3∃X3∃Y (X 6= Y ∧ Φ(X) ∧ Φ(Y ))
into the definition of a modal model. World-bound individuals cannot be role-swappers.
However, they may be substitutes, and the ensuing argument might as well be put in
terms of individuals instead of properties.
As an anti-haecceitist, Lewis classifies worlds that differ only through substitution of
individuals as indiscernible, but as a quidditist, he classifies worlds that differ only through
substitution of properties as discernible. (I presume that Sider agrees with Lewis on this
issue.) I put the argument in terms of properties rather than individuals to get the stronger
conclusion thatML fails to distinguish between different cardinalities of discernible worlds.
20Following Sider, I am assuming S5 here. Otherwise a conjunction of sentences that
start with a modal operator, such as (2), may be true in one world and false in another.
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Following that pattern, we can express that some possible property with
repertoire Φ has at least two alternatives:
(5) 3∃X3∃Y3∃Z(X 6= Y ∧X 6= Z ∧ Y 6= Z ∧ Φ(X) ∧ Φ(Y ) ∧ Φ(Z))
It is now obvious how to express, for a given natural number n, that some
property with repertoire Φ has at least n alternatives. By conjoining (3), we
can express that there are at least n substitutes. Let the sentence expressing
that be Φn . A class of sentences that contains Φn , for every n, only has
models with infinitely many Φ-substitutes. Thus ML can express that there
are infinitely many substitutes. So far, all is well with ML.
But there is no way for this language to distinguish among infinite car-
dinalities of substitutes. To be sure, ML allows infinite blocks of quantifiers
and infinite conjunctions. But this does not yield infinite alternations of
existential quantifiers with other symbols. In standard infinitary languages,
there are no infinite alternations of existential and universal quantifiers, or
of quantifiers and negations. Likewise, there are no infinite alternations of
diamonds and quantifiers in ML; the pattern at the beginning of (5) can only
be repeated finitely many times. Thus a sentence built after this template
can distinguish only between models with finite numbers of alternatives. The
position of the Φ’s and the negated identities may be different than in (5), but
any sentence expressing that there are n alternatives must alternate quanti-
fiers and modal operators no fewer than n times. Since sentences of that type
are the only candidates, no ML-sentence can make any distinctions among
infinite cardinalities of them.
Suppose now there are infinitely many substitutes for some possible prop-
erty. Then for any infinite cardinal κ, there will be a realistic modal model in
which there are exactly κ substitutes. Hence all sentences in the possibilist
language about infinite cardinalities of substitutes will lack a truth-value,
given (1). As a consequence, ML cannot tell us how many individuals, prop-
erties or worlds there are in modal space. There will be realistic modal models
of different cardinalities, and some claims about the cardinality of the class
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of worlds or of the class of properties will lack a truth-value.
I anticipate the response that the new problem of expressive power is
not serious. In practice, it may be argued, philosophers do not make claims
whose truth depends on how many substitutes there are.21 In my view, it
would be good if this were true, but I am not sure it is. For once one is
thinking in the possible-worlds-framework, such claims appear natural. This
can be illustrated by an example involving worlds that are structurally like
ours, i.e. have the same pattern of distribution of properties in regions of
spacetime, but possibly with different properties in corresponding places. In
some world that is structurally alike, schmass may be instantiated wherever
mass is in the actual world.
Suppose a hypothetical philosopher Louise thinks there are worlds struc-
turally like ours where mass, but no other property is replaced. Since any
finite upper bound on the number of such replacement worlds would be arbi-
trary, Louise claims that there are infinitely many of them. She holds that all
these replacements have the same repertoire. Slightly heretically, she denies
that mass and its replacement properties are freely recombinable in such a
way as to be able to co-exist in a world. Hence she is committed to there
being infinitely many substitutes of mass. Further, she holds that we cannot
epistemically rule out any world that is structurally like our world, and that
our credence in a world that we cannot epistemically rule out is non-zero.
From these claims it follows that at least as many worlds are given non-zero
credence as there are substitutes of mass. Since at most denumerably many
worlds can be given non-zero credence,22 Louise is committed to affirm the
21This response lowers the standards for a successful reduction. It is then not at all
clear any more whether Linguistic Ersatzism does not meet the lower standards as well,
for philosophers do not too frequently make claims whose truth-value depends on the
possibility of alien role-swappers either.
22A world has positive probability iff for some n, P (w) > 12n . Let W n = {w : P (w) >
1
2n }; then the set of all worlds with positive probability is
⋃
n∈NW n . But for a given n,
W n has at most 2n elements, since the probabilities cannot sum to more than one. Hence
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two following possibilist sentences: ‘There are infinitely many substitutes of
mass.’ and ‘There are not uncountably many substitutes of mass’. But ac-
cording to Pluriversal Ersatzism, if the first of these is true, the second lacks
a truth-value, and if the second is true, then the first is false.23 Hence it
Pluriversal Ersatzism is right, these sentences are not both true, and thus
neither is Louise’s theory, taken as a set of sentences formulated in the possi-
bilist language. By issuing this verdict, Pluriversal Ersatzism clearly violates
its professed neutrality among philosophical theories that have a consistent
formulation in the possibilist language.
4 Considering Patches
My argument shows that ML, the language Sider specified, is not powerful
enough to reduce the possibilist language. The question remains whether
something in the spirit of his proposal does work. Is there some technical
trick that could save the project? I offer reasons to think that this is unlikely.
The limitations of ML may well be the limitations of any approach that takes
the modal operators as primitive.
To begin with, it is important to be clear what the rules of the game
are. In one sense, it is trivial to express that there are uncountably many
substitutes in a language of boxes and diamond. For we can express it in
English, and we could easily set up a coding of sentences of English in a
the set of worlds with positive probability is a countable union of finite sets, and thus itself
countable.
23Suppose ‘There are infinitely many substitutes of mass.’ is true. By the argument
above, there is a realistic model with countably and a realistic modal with uncountably
many substitutes of mass. By (1), ‘There are not uncountably many substitutes of mass.’
is neither true nor false.
Suppose that latter sentence is true. Then there are at most countably many substitutes
of mass in every realistic modal model. By the argument above, there are at most finitely
many; hence ‘There are infinitely many substitutes of mass.’ is false.
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language of boxes and diamonds (or, for that matter, any other language with
a sufficiently rich syntax). We could then stipulate that the sentences of that
language mean what their English decodings mean. Of course, though, this
is of no significance to the question whether the possibilist language can be
reduced. It is a constraint on the reduction that the box and diamond have,
at least roughly, the meaning of our familiar ‘necessarily’ and ‘possibly’.
Still, we need to ask whether the power of the language can be increased
while being faithful to what the symbols mean. In this section, I examine
two pertinent proposals. One is technically attractive, but does not afford a
reduction in a philosophically interesting sense, as I argue in the next section.
The other can be dismissed because it surreptitiously introduces a possibilist
quantifier.
The first proposal involves a radical departure from the usual way of
specifying the syntax of infinitary languages: a modal language with non-
well-founded, or infinitely deep, sentences. To introduce this notion, it is
useful to think of a sentence as represented by a tree. For example, ∃x(Fx∧
Gx) can be represented by a tree of length 3; its bottom node is labelled by
∃x; above it, there is a node labelled by ∧; on level 3, there are two branches,
their nodes labelled by Fx and Gx, respectively. Standard languages only
allow trees that are both of finite width and length. Infinitary languages of
the type Sider employs make room for infinitely wide trees. Their formation
rules allow
∧
and
∨
to apply to infinitely many formulas, and the quantifiers
to a formula and infinitely many variables. Infinitely deep, or non-well-
founded sentences can be represented by trees that are infinitely long.24 Since
my argument above relies crucially on ML not being able to alternate 3
and ∃ infinitely many times, infinitely deep languages promise to remedy the
24Clearly, such sentences cannot be formed in ML, as specified by Sider: “The language
is infinitary, so the usual truth conditions for infinite conjunctions and infinite blocks of
quantifiers must be adapted to the modal case in the natural way.” (p.293). Sider refers
us to M.A. Dickmann, Large Infinitary Languages: Model Theory, (Amsterdam: North-
Holland, 1975), a work that does not discuss non-well-founded languages.
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problem of expressive power. In the attempt to give a semantics for infinitely
deep languages, concepts and methods from game theory have proved to be
fruitul.25
I am now sketching a game-theoretic semantics of an extension IDML of
ML that allows infinitely deep formulas.26 A sentence and a modal model
together define a game with two players, Myself (the initial verifier) and
Nature (the initial falsifier). If the game reaches a true atomic formula, I
win. If the game reaches a false atomic formula, Nature wins. A sentence is
true in a model if I have a winning strategy, and false if Nature has a winning
strategy.27 A game starts at the bottom node and then moves up the tree.
IDML has the standard rules of game-theoretic semantics: at a conjunction
node, the falsifier chooses a branch; at a disjunction, the verifier chooses a
branch; at a negation, the roles of the verifier and the falsifier are reversed;
at an existential quantification node, the verifier chooses an element of the
domain of the world of evaluation. At 3, the verifier chooses a world in the
modal model.
The infinitely deep sentence S, represented by the figure, is only true in
modal models with uncountably many alternatives with repertoire Φ. It is a
tree of length ω1 + 4, where ω1 is the first uncountable ordinal.
28
25The original and most widely used example of an infinitely deep construction is pro-
vided by the Henkin quantifier or game quantifier, which is equivalent to an infinite alter-
nation of universal and existential quantifiers. It is given a game-theoretic interpretation in
Yiannis N. Moschovakis, “The Game Quantifier”, Proceedings of the American Mathemat-
ical Society, 31, no. 1 (Jan. 1972): 245-50. Infinitely deep languages also allowing infinite
alternations of ∨ and ∧ have been explored by Jaakko Hintikka and Veikko Rantala, “A
New Approach to Infinitary Languages”, Annals of Mathematical Logic, 10 (1976): 95-115.
26For an introduction to game-theoretic semantics, see for example Jaakko Hintikka
and Gabriel Sandu, “Game-Theoretical Semantics”, in Johan van Benthem and Alice ter
Meulen (eds.), Handbook of Logic and Language, (Cambridge: MIT Press, 1997): pp.
361-410.
27The notion of a strategy may be understood in an intuitive way; formally, it is a
function mapping any initial segment of the game onto a next move.
28To save space, I draw one node with X1 6= X2 instead of one node with a negation
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Sentence S: (appended)
sign below a node with X1 = X2 ; and I do not draw separate nodes for ∃ and .
I choose a sentence of the length of a successor ordinal, to avoid discussion of what
constitutes winning a game that ends at a limit ordinal stage; see Hintikka and Rantala,
loc.cit.
16
Suppose the game S is played over a modal model M with uncountably
many Φ-substitutes. Let it be my strategy that at each diamond, I choose
a different world, and at the existential quantifier I choose a property with
repertoire Φ. If Nature at some point chooses a finite branch, leading to an
atomic formula, she loses. But eventually, she must choose a finite branch.
Hence on this strategy, I always win, and consequently S is true in M.
Suppose now that S is played over a modal model M′ with at most
countably many Φ-substitutes. Then it cannot be the case that I choose a
world and a property that both has repertoire Φ and is different from any
previously chosen property uncountably many times. As soon as I fail to do
so, Nature may choose the appropriate finite branch. Hence Nature has a
winning strategy, and S is false in M′.
A suitable elaboration of this sketch of IDML may well technically yield a
reduction of the possibilist language. However, given the story of punctures
and patches so far, it seems reasonable to remain skeptical until we have
a proof that such a language can characterize modal models up to isomor-
phism. However, I argue in the next section that even if such a proof were
forthcoming, its philosophical significance would be limited. First, though,
I want to show that the second proposal, requiring a less drastic revision of
syntax and semantics, does not help.
In my argument above, I exploit the inability ofML to alternate diamonds
and existential quantifiers infinitely many times. Thus there is a temptation
to modify the language to allow an infinite repetition of the pattern 3∃,
maybe using the notation [3∃].29 Thus if Φ is a formula and τ a sequence of
variables, [3∃]τΦ should be read as 3∃v13∃v2 ...Φ.
Since ML already allows infinite repetitions of ∃, this might seem a small
step. However, there is a crucial difference between the ways [3∃] and ∃
operate on infinitely many arguments. ∃ takes in a set, and the result of
applying it can be evaluated in one step. [3∃], on the other hand, takes in
29Thanks to Ted Sider and an anomymous referee for suggestions on this point.
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a sequence, and the result of applying it needs to be evaluated in as many
steps as there are elements in the well-ordering. For every occurrence of 3
takes us to another world in the model. As long as there are only finitely
many variables, this presents no problem, since then the result of pre-fixing
[3∃] is equivalent to a formula in the language without that new symbol.
But in order to increase the expressive power, [3∃] needs to operate on an
infinite sequence. Semantically, the resulting sentence is infinitely deep, or
non-well-founded; there is an infinitely descending chain under the relation
of being a proper subformula. In the syntax, this is merely disguised by
the use of the notation [3∃]. We are used to evaluate a formula in finitely
many steps until we reach atomic formulas. Infinitely deep formulas do not
allow this. To interpret them, we may still proceed in steps indexed by the
ordinals; but since infinitely many steps are required, we need a new rule for
the limit ordinal step.
If this proposal is to be also semantically and not just syntactically differ-
ent from the game-theoretic one, another rule for the ordinal step is needed.
It is tempting to simply stipulate that after [3∃]σ, where σ is a sequence of
variables whose length is a limit ordinal, Φ is to be evaluated at the actual
world. Thus [3∃]σΦ is true in a modal model if there is a world w1 where a
σ1 exists and a world w2 (that may or may not be distinct from w1 ) where a
σ2 exists and ... such that Φ is true of σ1 , σ2 , etc. at the actual world. Now
the language does indeed have the power to express that there are uncount-
ably many substitutes of a given property. But this has no tendency to help
Sider’s project of a reduction that is acceptable for actualists. For [3∃] with
these stipulated truth-conditions is just a cumbersome notational variant of
an infinitary possibilist quantifier, i.e. a quantifier that ranges at any world
over all possibilia, whether they exist in that world or not. It is a quantifier
of the sort that an actualist is seeking a reduction for.
I do not know how to show in general that no other such move will help,
but I am extremely skeptical. We have to recognize that the diamond and
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the existential quantifier already have their meaning given by their recursive
clauses. It is not open to us to stipulate that they have special meanings
when they happen to occur in a certain syntactic configuration. In the above
example, the notation [3∃] tried to suggest that we have a combination of
familiar symbols, but failed to conceal that it was a new primitive operator in
the language. I cannot pre-empt every actualist attempt to introduce a new
operator and argue that we understand it independently of the possibilist
language. But before such a proposal is made and adequately defended,
possibilist discourse cannot count as reducible in a way that is acceptable to
actualists.
5 Renouncing Parts of Paradise?
My argument shows that Pluriversal Ersatzism fails on Sider’s standards. A
reduction is not supposed to rule on substantive questions in modal meta-
physics. In particular, it should not rule that there are most finitely many
alternatives, in order to prevent embarassing questions from arising. Thus it
needs to make sense of all questions asked in the possibilist language.
By adopting IDML, that problem might be overcome. This language has a
deviant syntax, though, and calling it a “language” at all might be stretching
the notion. But even if a solution to the technical problem can be found,
there remains a philosophical worry. A reduction is only philosophically (as
opposed to technically) significant if the reducing language is understood
independently of the language to be reduced. There is a serious worry that
already ML cannot be understood independently of the possibilist language.
The problem is not that we do not speak a Lagadonian language, but rather
that it is not clear that we have a conception of what it is for sentences about
role-swappers and substitutes to be true or false, if we are not thinking in
terms of possibilia. For the sake of the argument, however, I grant that we
do. But I want to insist that IDML would be a philosophically ill-motivated
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choice of a reducing language. A language with sentences that cannot be
produced by any finite number of applications of rules is essentially beyond
what finite creatures like us can comprehend. If we cannot comprehend it,
there is no reason to assume that it is indeed a language, in the sense of a
class whose members are true or false, and not just some non-representing
mathematical structure. As far as I can see, the only way in which we could
specify an interpretation for IDML is by using the possibilist language, which
would defeat the purpose of the reduction.
I recommend that actualists brace themselves for the discovery that pos-
sibilist discourse is not fully reducible to modal sentential operators. This
need not tell against actualism, but rather against some instances of possi-
bilist discourse. Maybe our hypothetical Louise should stop worrying about
how many substitutes mass has. The path of wisdom is to start with the
modal distinctions that do make sense, and tailor the use of the possibilist
language accordingly. By going that path, we might well renounce parts of
paradise, but eo ipso rid ourselves of Scheinprobleme raised by some unan-
swerable questions that can be asked in the possibilist language. As for giving
up the comforts of paradise, philosophers should be ready to pay that price
for attaining wisdom.
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A Proof of Elementary Equivalence
This appendix proves the elementary equivalence of two non-isomorphic
modal models relative to the modal language. M has non-denumerably
many worlds. In each of them, exactly one individual, one monadic prop-
erty, and the two-place identity relations for individuals and for properties
exist (there are no higher-order properties and relations), and the individual
instantiates the property. The individuals and properties of all these worlds
are distinct. The worlds of M′ are a denumerable subset of those of M; the
actual world @ is the same one in both models. (It would be easy to represent
M and M′ as 6-tuples corresponding to Sider’s definitions on pp. 292/293.)
The language, here called L, has names a for the actual individual, P for the
actual property, and = for the identity relation.
Let a mapping * of formulas of L into formulas be defined recursively
as follows:30 (i) For atomic φ, φ = φ*. (ii) (¬φ)* = ¬(φ*). (iii) (Aφ)* =
A(φ)*. (iv) (
∧
Φ)* =
∧
(Φ*). (v) (3φ)* = 3(φ*). (vi) (∃ →x φ(→x))* =
∃x0φ*(→x0 ). (vii) (∃
→
X φ(
→
X))* = ∃X0φ*(
→
X0 ). (Φ* = {φ*: φ ∈ Φ}; →x is a
(possibly infinite) sequence of individual variables;
→
x0 is a sequence of the
same length, each of whose entries is x0 ; and analogously for the upper-case
property variables.)
Lemma 1. a) For every L-formula φ, world w and assignment σ, Mwσ |= φ
iff Mwσ |= φ*. b) The same for M′.
Proof. This is trivial for atomic formulas. The inductive steps for nega-
tion, conjunction, the actuality-operator and the diamond are straightfor-
ward. Existential quantification: Suppose Mw ,σ |= ∃ →x φ(→x)). Since ∃ →x
φ(
→
x)) is logically equivalent to ∃ →x ∨{x0 6= xi : i 6= 0 and xi occurs in
→
x} ∨∃ →x0 φ(→x0 ), Mw ,σ |= ∃ →x
∨{x0 6= xi : i 6= 0 and xi occurs in →x} or
Mw ,σ |= ∃ →x0 φ(→x0 ). Since the first disjunct is false for any world in M,
30For the idea to use that mapping and Lemma 1 in the proof, I am indebted to John
P. Burgess.
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Mw ,σ |= ∃ →x0 φ(→x0 ). Let σ(x/w) denote the assignment that differs from
σ at most in that it assigns the individual in w to the variable x. Hence
Mw ,σ(x0 ,w) |= φ(
→
x0 ), and by the induction hypothesis, Mw ,σ(x0 ,w) |= φ*(
→
x0 ).
Hence Mw ,σ |= ∃x0φ*(→x0 ). The argument for the property quantifier is
exactly analogous; and so is the induction to prove b).
The language L* is defined like Sider’s L, except for the quantifier- and
the conjunction-rule: If φ is a formula of L* and x, X variables, then ∃xφ
and ∃Xφ are formulas of L* (however, infinite blocks of quantifiers cannot be
introduced); and if Φ is a (possibly infinite) set of formulas with only finitely
many distinct variables occuring in it, then
∧
Φ is a formula of L*. It is easy
to check that for every sentence φ of L, φ* is a sentence of L*.
An assignment σ for L* is an ordered pair <σI , σP>, where σI is an
Ω-sequence of finitely many individuals, and σP analogously for properties.
An L*-isomorphism between world-assignment pairs is defined as follows:
<w, σI , σP> is L*-isomorphic to <w
′, σ′I , σ′P> iff all of the following con-
ditions hold: (i) Actuality-Preservation: a) If w = @ or w′ = @, then
w = w′. b) If σI (n) = a or σ′I (n) = a, then σI (n) = σ′(n). c) Likewise
for the property assignment. (ii) Identity-Preservation: a) σI (n) = σI (m) iff
σ′I (n) = σ′I (m). b) Likewise for the property assignment. (iii) Instantiation-
Preservation: σI (n) and σP(m) are worldmates iff σ
′
I (n) and σ
′
P(m) are
worldmates. (iv) a) σI (n) is in w iff σ
′
I (n) is in w
′. b) σP(n) is in w iff
σ′P(n) is in w′.
Lemma 2. For any formula φ of L*, worlds w and w′ and assignments σ and
σ′ such that <w, σ> and <w′, σ′> are isomorphic, Mwσ |= φ iff Mw ′σ′ |= φ.
Proof. It is routine to check that the conditons on L*-isomorphisms en-
sure that this holds for atomic formulas. The inductive clauses for negation
and conjunction are straightforward. Actuality-operator: Mwσ |= Aψ iff
M@σ |= Aψ. Since <@, σ> and <@, σ′> are isomorphic,M@σ′ |= Aψ by the
induction hypothesis. Hence Mwσ′ |= Aψ. Diamond: Suppose Mwσ |= 3ψ.
By definition, Mw∗σ |= ψ for some world w*. Then there is a world w*′
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such that <w*, σ> and <w*′, σ′> are isomorphic. Thus Mw∗′σ′ |= ψ by the
induction hypothesis. By definition, Mw ′σ′ |= 3ψ. Existential quantifica-
tion: SupposeMwσ |= ∃xψ(x). ThenMwσ(x/w) |= ψ(x). Since <w, σ(x/w)>
and <w′, σ′(x/w′)> are isomorphic,Mw ′σ′(x/w ′) |= ψ(x) by the induction hy-
pothesis, and thus Mw ′σ′ |= ∃xψ(x). The clause for the property quantifier
is exactly analagous. 
A shared world is one that belongs to both models; equivalently, one that
belongs to M′. A shared assignment assigns only individuals and properties
from shared worlds.
Lemma 3. For any formula φ of L*, shared assignment σ and shared world
w, Mwσ |= φ iff M′wσ |= φ.
Proof. For atomic formulas, this is immediate from the construction of
the models. The clauses for negation, conjunction, and the actuality-operator
are straightforward. φ = 3ψ: Suppose Mwσ |= 3ψ. Then there is a world
w′ such that Mw ′σ |= ψ. For some shared world w′′, <w′, σ> and <w′′, σ>
are isomorphic. (Either w′ is shared, in which case w′ = w′′; or w′ is not
shared, then since σ is shared, w′′ may be any shared world not involved
in σ.) By Lemma 2 and the induction hypothesis, M′w ′′σ |= ψ. Hence
M′wσ |= 3ψ. The other direction is straightforward. φ = ∃xψ(x): Suppose
Mwσ |= ∃xψ(x). ThenMwσ(x/w) |= ψ(x). Since σ(x/w) is obviously a shared
assignment, it follows that M′wσ(x/w) |= ψ(x) by the induction hypothesis,
and hence M′wσ |= ∃xψ(x). Again, the other direction is straightforward.
The clause for the property quantifier is exactly analogous. 
Proposition. The non-isomorphic modal models M and M′ are elemen-
tarily equivalent relative to L; i.e. for every sentence φ of L, M |= φ iff
M′ |= φ.
Proof. The harder direction is right-left: SupposeM′ |= φ, i.e. M′@σ |= φ
for everyM′-assignment (shared assignment) σ. By Lemma 1.b),M′@σ |= φ*
for every shared σ. By Lemma 3, and since @ a shared world, M@σ |= φ*
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for every shared assignment. By Lemma 2, and since for every σ, there is
some shared σ′ such that <@, σ> and <@, σ> are isomorphic, M@σ |= φ*
for every σ. By Lemma 1.a), M@σ |= φ. 
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